

AJP-9(A)
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE
FOR
CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION


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INTRODUCTION

The 21st Century strategic environment involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and capability drivers, which require sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian catastrophes. Solutions to these serious events are impossible to be achieved by military means alone.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) comprehensive approach is the link is the link to the civil environment with civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as the military facilitator. This enables the military to reach the desired end state by coordinating, synchronizing and de-conflicting military activities with civil actors, thus linking military operations with the civil sector. The influence of the vast variety of civil contributions to stabilise a dysfunctional society must continue to be considered by the military. This will enable the smooth transition from combat focused to full spectrum stability operations, thus reaching a status of development where Alliance forces can leave a stabilised area behind much sooner.

CIMIC, as an integral part of modern multidimensional operations, addresses all parties within a conflict situation, facilitates the transition of civilian capabilities to military operations and vice versa. The governing idea in all those interactions is reaching the defined and commonly desired end state, for the best of the local population, the civil actors and the Alliance Forces.

In order to maximize success for all parties it is crucial that all sides fully understand how each partner plans and operates. On one hand military personnel at the tactical level will carry out CIMIC tasks, as described in AJP-9, directly contributing to the military effort as ‘boots on the ground’. On the other hand CIMIC tasks will be carried out by personnel not directly linked to CIMIC staff functions. The planning of military action demands CIMIC input, as does all other military work within and outside of the mission area. The multiple dimensions of modern military operations are all influenced by CIMIC, as their focus is on the civil environment. Not everything in the military is CIMIC, but without CIMIC the comprehensive approach will fail. CIMIC’s contribution and influence has to be visibly present at the strategic, the operational and the tactical level.

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PREFACE

Allied Joint Doctrine 01 (AJP-01) outlines NATO strategy for establishing peaceful and secure environments across a wide spectrum of threats and challenges, ranging from armed conflict to humanitarian emergency, which could affect Euro-Atlantic stability. Modern conflict solutions demand much more than just defeat of the military opponent. NATO has identified a comprehensive approach as the most appropriate answer to these threats and challenges. This strategic analysis, demanding comprehensiveness for NATO operations, creates the need for operational guidelines within this spectrum. CIMIC is the enabler and facilitator for comprehensiveness between NATO forces and civil actors committed to the solution of a specific crisis.

AJP-9 on CIMIC builds on AJP-01, whereby coherence is achieved through the harmonisation of strategic processes, planning and objectives across civil and military instruments and agencies. In addition to AJP-9, other Allied Joint Publications, such as AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations and AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, which cover factors of influence for civil-military interaction, operational and planning factors contributing to conduct of military missions. Therefore all relevant publications have to be used in an integrated way to develop comprehensive solutions.

AJP-9 addresses commanders and their staffs at strategic, operational and tactical level. It displays all relevant factors for efficient civil military interaction within a comprehensive approach. It fosters the development of CIMIC activities, introducing all necessary principles, planning factors and training requirements.

Correspondingly, the AJP-9 “Civil-Military Cooperation” reflects this approach as well as all other NATO keystone documents for the operational level to enable joint civil-military interaction.

This revised version of AJP-9 aims to provide generic doctrine which is flexible in application. This approach will intentionally allow CIMIC to adjust to different operational realities through improvisation and adaptation.

All related tactical publications should be synchronised with AJP-9.

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CHAPTER 1 – THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF CIMIC

21st Century Threats

0101. Large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is unlikely in the near future but the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term remains. Meanwhile the security of the Alliance will be challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as well as non-military, and will often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, both of which could develop rapidly. Ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, disputes over vital resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states will lead to local and regional instability. The resulting tensions could create a wide spectrum of consequences, ranging from the need to provide humanitarian assistance to armed conflict. They could also affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO members and could affect the security of other states.
0102. The spread of nuclear capabilities outside the Alliance constitutes a potential threat to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and devices in parallel with the development of innovative means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern.
0103. The spread of weapons technology has increased access to sophisticated military capabilities. Adversaries now have the potential to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, the Alliance's growing reliance on information and information systems creates vulnerability to cyber attack, which may reduce or cancel NATO's superiority in conventional weaponry.
0104. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies would generate a response under Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, Alliance security interests could be affected by other extant or emerging risks including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people (particularly as a consequence of armed conflict) or disputes over often dwindling vital resources. The various forums in the Alliance give member states platforms to discuss mutual security issues under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the opportunity to coordinate their responses to risks of this kind.
- 0105. The Evolving Strategic Environment.** Alliance doctrine must take into account the changing context in which armed forces are used. The strategic environment will become increasingly dynamic and complex. There will be a variety of factors that directly influence or cause change, as well as discernible patterns in that change. There will also be a handful of key strategic drivers of change: globalization of society, political geometry, demographic and environmental change and the impact of technology. The implication of these strategic drivers, and from an examination of their military implications, provides some trends for defence and security:

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- a. **Globalization.** The process of globalization continues. This pattern of cultural import and export provokes conflict in areas of the world where cultures and values collide; action by anti-capitalists and extremists are two examples of such reactions. Twenty-four hour news media will continue to broadcast the realities of globalization to an ever-growing audience. Terrorists and extremists have and will continue to become more sophisticated in their use of the media and information networks to foster unrest through targeted information campaigns.

- b. **Political Geometry.** Notwithstanding the effects of globalization, nation states will remain key geopolitical players and most will retain armed forces. However, the way in which state sovereignty is exercised will change.
 - (1) There is likely to be greater interdependence between states and a shift in power from states to transnational organisations and networks or multinational corporations.
 - (2) Alliance members are likely to become more open as societies. They will be increasingly reliant on global stability, particularly with key trading partners in Europe, North America and, increasingly, Asia.
 - (3) This greater interdependence of states will have benefits. For example, increased interaction should advance understanding, reducing the potential for interstate conflict.
 - (4) Failing states are likely to become a more persistent and pervasive threat to global security. For example non-state actors may exploit the vacuum caused by their deterioration. There is potential to undermine the security of the Alliance in a world where concern for personal and collective security is gaining prominence over the defence of territory against conventional attack. A failed state that has little strategic significance in the traditional sense of resources or geographical location can take on strategic importance as a potential base for non-state actors. The Alliance may therefore choose, or be called upon, to intervene more frequently to stabilize dangerous situations in poorly or ungoverned territory. Any attendant rise in support for extremist groups will continue to demand the diplomatic, and potentially military, involvement of Alliance nations.
 - (5) The technical and economic strength of NATO and other developed states will stimulate innovation by an adversary to achieve political objectives, including the unconventional use of armed violence. Reaction to such threats must be coordinated across all instruments of state power, which will necessitate close liaison between multilateral networks and organizations.

- c. **Demographic and Environmental Change.** Demographic differences between the developing and developed world will widen. This will lead to significant migratory pressures from one to the other, increasing ethnic tensions and putting stress on employment and welfare systems:

- (1) Competition for scarce resources will continue, and global demand for energy resources in particular will intensify. Although oil and gas reserves are sufficient for the near future, their location and transport routes will present security challenges for developed and developing nations alike. Starvation and water scarcity will remain a significant problem for sections of the developing world.
- (2) Impoverishment and inequitable distribution of resources can lead to grievances, provokes extremists and offers opportunities for organized crime to threaten security. Poverty, hunger and disease in the developing world contribute to increasing stress in the security environment.
- (3) Poor resource distribution and governance in areas affected by demographic and environmental change will compound this problem. This will further increase migratory pressures, internal instability and calls for humanitarian intervention.
- d. **Technology and Military Transformation.** Technology continues to be a key driver of change that will pose both new threats and new opportunities. As access to current and emerging technology becomes more widespread, there will be greater opportunities for potential adversaries to develop effective conventional and unconventional means for direct and indirect attack on Alliance nations. The proliferation of technologies such as information and communications, biotechnology and nanotechnology will be led by industry rather than the military and, because of globalization, will be more accessible than hitherto. Consequently, assuming a given level of political pressure and access to finance, it will be easier for a range of both state and non-state actors to gain access to technology, including greater lethal power and including CBRN weapons.

Trends within the Military Dimension

0106. **The Future Balance of Military Power.** The future balance of military power will be affected largely by three issues:
- a. **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** WMD and their means of delivery will proliferate significantly unless successfully controlled. A limited number of countries may develop a nuclear weapons capability in the absence of external intervention, but a greater number could potentially acquire biological and chemical weapons. Ballistic delivery systems will extend in range. Non-ballistic systems and particularly non-military delivery mechanisms⁴ will become more prevalent. In the event that non-state actors acquire WMD they will be much harder to target, and therefore deter than state proliferators, presenting a strategic security threat. Delayed lethality and nonlethal weapons such as electromagnetic pulse weapons, radiological and carcinogenic chemical weapons may become more accessible.

- b. **Posture and Alliances.** While the majority of Alliance members continue to depend on NATO to guard against a strategic threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, a conventional state-on-state threat is unlikely. Alliance nuclear capability, and potentially missile defence, will demonstrate to states armed with WMD that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. Many Allies will concentrate on niche capabilities, pooling specialist resources to achieve operational and fiscal efficiency. Activities will normally be in coalition, typically be reactive (rather than pre-emptive) and expeditionary, and may occur over geographic areas well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.
 - c. **'Hybrid' Threats.** Evidence suggests that there is likely to be a further blurring of the boundaries between state and non-state actors (such as insurgents, terrorists and criminals) and NATO may subsequently confront an adversary using both regular and irregular tactics. This could be a compound threat of coincidental or uncoordinated actors, or hybrid when used by a determined adversary in a simultaneous and coordinated manner. These adversaries will use hybrid threats to exploit Alliance vulnerabilities wherever possible. They may not be bound by Western legal or ethical frameworks allowing them to challenge NATO in ways that can be difficult to anticipate. Countering a hybrid threat may require placing a greater emphasis on actions with effects in the cognitive domain as the battle for hearts and minds of the population is likely to ensue. Adversaries may also choose to employ a long-term strategy, such as avoiding defeat rather than seeking victory. Success in countering a hybrid threat may not be possible using the military instrument alone. Instead, a broader comprehensive approach, supported by information operations, will be required.
0107. **The Potential Adversary.** Potential adversaries are expected to be drawn from three broad categories of protagonists: nations, factions within a state and non-state actors.
- a. **Nation State.** The ability of a nation to engage in armed conflict will remain the ultimate indication of state power. However, for three principal reasons the occurrence of interstate conflict is likely to reduce. Firstly, the bipolar competition and surrogate wars characterised by the superpowers in the Cold War is unlikely to be repeated in the near term. Secondly, Alliance conventional military superiority is likely to discourage conventional strategic attacks on it, or on those areas where it has strategic interests. Thirdly, the risks for protagonists are increasing due to the cost and lethality of weapon systems and the strong international presumption against war and its penalties.
 - b. **Factions within a State.** Intra-state conflict will become more common as globalization broadens awareness of cultural friction, ineffective governance and the ease with which destabilising groups can operate. Factions may attempt to prevent international engagement, or actively encourage it if the faction believes this may enhance its chances of success. Use of proxy forces is likely to become a common factor in discretionary wars, although these forces can prove difficult to manage in military support to stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts, particularly when reforming indigenous armed services and police forces (i.e. Security Sector Reform).

- c. **Non-State Actors.** There will be potential for conflict between states' militaries and law enforcement agencies, and a growing range of non-state actors (particularly terrorists). Their incentive is to seek strategic effect and their ability to act internationally is increasing. State militaries will be required to develop counter-terrorism capabilities in order to allow them to have an increased role in engaging adversaries, employing terrorism, both domestically, within their own overseas territories and abroad. This may involve seeking to disrupt or destroy terrorist organizations, or to prevent (through support to diplomacy) or interrupt (by military means) state support to them; where possible in support of state law enforcement agencies. State militaries will be required to broaden their capabilities, for example to assist in countering organized crime (as this grows in sophistication, scope and scale, and even adopts paramilitary style techniques and capabilities).
0108. By using unconventional (often illegal under International Law) methods and irregular forces, some of NATO's adversaries will seek ways to negate military advantage by undermining the Alliance's cohesion, will, credibility, and influence. The threat that such adversaries can pose both to the military forces and to civil societies of the Alliance is termed 'asymmetric' because it is not possible for the Alliance to counter it in an equal way or by equal methods. This asymmetric threat is mainly defined by:
- a. The nature of an adversary himself; he may be difficult to recognize, identify and target, or unresponsive to attempts at negotiation.
 - b. The nature of an adversary's ideals and objectives where they are at odds with the Alliance members' own values, beliefs, priorities, and legal and moral constraints.
 - c. The unconventional methods that an adversary may employ to counter a qualitative and quantitative advantage.

Implications for the Military

0109. The complexity of the operating environment, and the consequent need to maintain a focus beyond the central principle of collective defence, has demanded a re-evaluation of the likelihood of NATO involvement in Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CROs).⁷ NA5CROs are a major part of the Alliance's contribution to effective crisis management. Their purpose is the contribution to international peace and security. They are intended to respond to such crises, to include the containment of hostilities, in a timely and coordinated manner where these crises could either affect the security of NATO nations, or threaten stability and lead to conflict on the periphery of the Alliance. NA5CROs encompass the Alliance's conduct of, and participation in, the full range of operations to include those in support of peace, which could range from the most demanding types of peace enforcement to military preventative activities, as directed by the North Atlantic Council.

Enduring Nature of Conflict

0110. NATO is a political-military alliance. The ability to fight - to bring violence, or the threat of violence, to the operating space - remains NATO's *raison d'etre* and is critical to success wherever there is the possibility of hostile opposition. The challenges facing those service personnel who deploy on operations remain:

- a. **Friction.** Friction is the force that frustrates action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. Friction may be mental – indecision over what to do next. It may be physical - the effects of intense enemy fire. It may be externally imposed - by the action of an adversary or the weather. It may be self-induced - by a poor plan or clashes of personality.
- b. **Chaos.** Because it is a human activity, conflict is uncertain and chaotic. Incomplete, inaccurate or contradictory information creates a *'fog of war'*, which limits perceptions and causes confusion. A commander, on either side, should exploit chaos by imposing it on his opponent, yet bringing greater order to his own schemes. Understanding the nature of the operating environment, of the opponent, how he thinks, and how he might act and react, is a prerequisite of gaining this advantage. Because armed conflict is essentially chaotic, chance always plays a role.
- c. **Danger.** Force - whether applied or threatened - is the primary means by which a commander compels an adversary to do what he wants. The application of force, or its threat, brings danger and with it fear. To a greater or lesser degree all men and women feel fear, and a commander has an important role to play in helping those he commands to overcome their fear, and thereby contribute to success.
- d. **Human Stress.** Combat is a stressful activity; the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion, loneliness and privation adversely affect, to a varying degree, the willpower of all those involved. To defeat an enemy militarily it is necessary to erode the willpower of the enemy commander and the forces under his command, whilst maintaining the willpower and morale of one's own forces.

Evolving Character of Operations

111. NATO forces operate throughout a continuum of conflict, within which peace and war cannot always be distinguished clearly. The evolution of a conflict will continue to be unpredictable; its prevalence, scale and intensity will change along the continuum of conflict from war, through inter- and intra-state conflict, and ultimately to peace. NATO forces will confront a variety of situations and threats, both state and non-state, potentially at the same time and in the same operating area. Moreover, within the increasingly complex problems faced by commanders the relationships between cause and effect are increasingly hard to predict. Therefore, the way commanders *frame* complex problems is becoming more important.
112. Adversaries, both state and non-state, are adapting fast to the Alliance's military strength and their preferred ways of operating. Already this adaption has made assumptions, such as rapid decisive effect, look dated. Adversaries in regions with multiple persistent systematic problems, using de-centralised command styles and an ability to exploit the clutter of heavily populated areas, are unlikely to present themselves in sterile battle space for precision attack. Conflict is less likely to end in clear 'victory' and it will be the resilience and institutional agility as much as technological mastery that will define the Alliance's chances of success. History has shown that asymmetry is not 'new', but some of its modern manifestations are new. Traditionally the Alliance has referred to a spectrum of conflict, ranging from stable peace, via humanitarian assistance to general war. This implied that there are discrete types of conflict with traditional 'war' against near-peers as the professional benchmark. This binary, linear, sequential view overlooked the inevitable concurrency and unique challenges posed by conflicts that have different characteristics. Discrete operational themes actually overlap and merge. Conflict can now be seen as a blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals. Future conflict will blend the lethality traditionally associated with state-on-state conflict and the protracted nature of irregular warfare.
113. At the extreme, NATO forces may be required to engage in conventional war fighting against well-resourced opponents, with technologically advanced weapon systems and equipment. NATO forces should therefore be prepared, equipped, and trained for the most complex and demanding of high-intensity war fighting campaigns. Interoperability is the key consideration for an effective alliance war fighting force.
114. More likely, NATO forces may be confronted, possibly simultaneously, by groups or individuals operating in unpredictable and innovative ways, and employing tactics that have no regard for either International law or widely accepted norms of morality. Those engaging in this Irregular Activity⁸ may exploit civilians in order to promote their aims and maximise the impact of their actions. Conducting operations where '*the people in the streets and houses and fields - all the people anywhere - are the battlefield*' the so-called war amongst the people has significant implications for NATO forces. Positive identification and engagement of opponents, particularly in urban areas, will become more difficult and heighten the risk of collateral damage. Furthermore, in complex political and social contexts where the will of the indigenous population becomes the metaphorical vital ground (i.e. it must be retained or controlled for success), there is a requirement to influence and shape perceptions through the judicious fusion of both physical and psychological means. In order for NATO forces to do this effectively, they need a detailed understanding of the situation, its human context, and the other agencies that could help to achieve a desired outcome.

115. Intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing will be critical to anticipating and, possibly, preventing or containing conflicts. Intelligence processes include agencies not traditionally associated with military operations, for example law-enforcement agencies, and non-traditional sources, such as engagement with non-governmental actors. A full understanding of the operational environment and a proactive approach in the earliest stages of an emerging crisis will be required. This assessment will support increased situational awareness and aid enhanced intelligence sharing and collaboration in rapidly evolving situations. Improvements in all aspects of the decision making cycle may be necessary so that the time between the anticipation of a risk or threat, and the definition and subsequent execution of an operation can be shortened.
116. A growing public awareness brought about by greater accessibility of information, coupled with the necessity to maintain domestic public support may lead to further constraints being placed upon the military, whilst simultaneously increasing the requirement to demonstrate rapid success. These factors and their legal codification will influence the military's application of force within a need for accountability and proportionality. Thus, the Alliance must be capable of operating under political, media and public scrutiny whilst maintaining the requirements for operational security.
117. The Alliance's military posture will continue to adapt to respond to evolving threats and challenges. The posture provides the Alliance with a broad set of capabilities that enable the projection of stability, assure nations and partners, deter adversaries and other aggression across the continuum of conflict. The Alliance structures itself for the most likely operations with the agility to adapt to the most demanding.
118. NATO forces might intervene in crises, for example, to strengthen, uphold or restore peace and security, to re-establish governance and authority, or to provide humanitarian assistance. NATO forces will usually be but one contributor; and while different participants' respective goals may be broadly aligned, each is nevertheless shaped by different perspectives, priorities, motivations, mandates, timeframes, cultures and processes. This complex of actors may include, in addition to multinational military forces, the indigenous population with their formal and informal authorities, media, diplomats, International Organisations such as the United Nations (UN), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private military and security companies, multinational companies and opportunists.
119. NATO must seek to influence these complex situations through the application of Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic instruments of power, and civil capabilities. Individually, each is limited in terms of its discrete influence and impact. The likelihood of a favourable and enduring outcome is therefore enhanced through the careful use of all instruments in concert, using the 'commonly understood principles and collaborative processes' of a Comprehensive Approach (described in the following paragraphs). What constitutes an appropriate combination of the instruments of power will depend upon the context.

NATO's Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach

120. NATO experiences in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other operations confirm the complexity of contemporary crises. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. Today's

challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community, including the coordinated action from an appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO's military and political instruments with the other instruments of power. This needs to be a broader cooperation and planning in accordance with the principles and decisions of relevant senior NATO bodies. NATO's engagement in a comprehensive approach to crisis management is focused at three levels:

- a. At the political and strategic level, NATO concentrates on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors.
- b. At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required.
- c. At the theatre level, NATO force commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local authorities and other international actors in the execution of operations.

All 3 levels must function in a complementary manner to achieve success.

121. NATO considers there to be three targets in the successful prosecution of a comprehensive approach:
 - a. Improving the coherent application of the Alliance's own crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures.
 - b. Improving the Alliance's practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN (and other relevant international organisations), governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local actors in the planning and conduct of operations.
 - c. Enhancing the Alliance's ability to bring military support to stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict in concert with other actors.
122. In the context of crisis management, the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual understanding and collaboration, and appropriate resourcing. This is necessarily predicated by political agreement on the desired outcome. A future desired outcome is likely to involve aspects related to security, governance, and economic development. The complexity or evolving nature of a crisis may preclude the definitive defining of the desired outcome. It may only be possible to look ahead months rather than years and reframing the problem and desired outcome may become necessary.
123. Political agreement on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives; however complete agreement between different actors may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued. Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome requires active involvement from each of the instruments of power. It also requires effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, across both NATO and a broad

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range of multinational institutions, agencies and organizations. Although the implementation of this comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation (strategic, operational and tactical), and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding principles apply:

- a. The need for proactive engagement between all actors, before and during a crisis.
 - b. The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language.
 - c. The value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate - institutional familiarity and information sharing are key.
 - d. Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome), and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose.
0124. From a military perspective, a comprehensive approach is founded on not only a shared situational understanding, but also recognition that sometimes non-military actors may support the military and conversely on other occasions the military's role will be supporting those actors. Recent NATO operations suggest that these elements are inter-dependent. A military plan is most likely to succeed (in making a significant contribution to the desired outcome) when it is nested within a comprehensive response, itself based upon a shared understanding of the problem and a universal commitment to resolve it. Unity of command may be elusive and, realistically, only unity of purpose can be achieved. In this case only through negotiation will commanders and other actors be able to confirm responsibilities, resolve differences, facilitate coordination and create unity of effort across a diverse multi-agency 'coalition'. Having terms of reference, memorandums of understanding or agreements at a high level provides some framework for coordination. Implementing the comprehensive approach requires sensitivity, rapport, respect, trust, patience and tact, as well as determination to collaborate in all actors, military and civilian, at all levels.
0125. The role of military force in achieving the desired outcome must be very carefully considered, and must be understood by those directing the strategy. If the successful use of force leads directly to the achievement of the desired outcome, then it can be said to be decisive. But if the military contribution simply enables, or supports, the achievement of the desired outcome by others, then it is not decisive. In the case of the latter, the importance of including from the outset those elements - diplomatic, civil, and economic - that are to be enabled by military success must not be underestimated. Failure to do so will at best lose the strategic initiative; at worst, it will result in strategic failure. This is the basic premise of a comprehensive approach, which NATO applies to its operations.

Cooperation, Confrontation and Conflict

126. Even before conflict arises, demonstrable military capability and measured power projection will contribute to deterrence (to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting against the interests of any Alliance member). Faced with either an imminent crisis or a more gradual deterioration in relations within or between states, NATO forces may be required to prevent further deterioration in security

- towards armed conflict. Deterrence may be supplemented or replaced by more assertive coercion and conflict prevention activities, such as focused military intervention. During periods of cooperation and confrontation, the focus is likely to be on deterrence and coercion; once conflict develops however, emphasis shifts to compellence by the application of force.
128. In broad terms the *striking* of an opponent, to remove his means and motivation to undermine security, must be combined with a subsequent (or possibly concurrent or over-lapping) *stabilization* of the overall crisis situation. To be genuinely successful, the removal of any threat must be accompanied by some level of assurance of future security.
129. Immediate post-conflict military activity seeks to re-establish and maintain security in order to enable stabilization. Stabilization is not an exclusively military endeavour; it requires a comprehensive response, with the military likely to be in a supporting role. NATO military forces are likely to focus on reducing the causes of conflict and instability, and enabling the other instruments of power to restore host-nation governance, capacity and authority (thereby ensuring that conditions do not again foment conflict). The achievement of these inter-related objectives of security and stability will demand the application of military effort to a variety of potentially concurrent activities.
130. The transition from conflict to stability is especially complex. As with security, the restoration of stability tends to be a relative and subjective matter (how stable is stable enough?). From a military perspective, the important criterion is likely to be whether the permissiveness of the environment will enable the activity of other actors in materialising the other instruments of power (International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, indigenous authorities and others) to fulfil their stabilization roles.

Campaign Evolution

131. Each and every campaign is likely to involve a different, and shifting, balance between major combat operations to remove threats, security operations to enable and support the process of stabilization, and enduring peace keeping. Boundaries between the outcomes sought over time (and hence the role of NATO forces) may be blurred; they may change suddenly and very obviously, or more gradually, even imperceptibly. As the emphasis afforded to these different activities and purposes varies over time, so the situation changes, and the NATO force must modify its posture and approach in order to deliver the weight of effort to each as appropriate.
132. It is important that NATO commanders resist the temptation to prejudge or prematurely classify a crisis. Rather NATO commanders should continually review the balance between types of operation over the course of a campaign, in terms of principal *purpose(s)* and the associated *weight of military effort* committed. The relationship between the purpose(s) of operations, described over time, defines the character of the campaign. Progress is measured in degrees of improving security and stability (to re-establish, on an enduring and self-sustaining basis, cooperation within and between states). Whilst NATO Commanders will focus on the military role within a campaign it must be understood that progress is always inter-dependent with that of non-military actors as part of a comprehensive response. Campaign evolution is considered in more detail in AJP 3-00.

Defining Characteristics of Operations

133. In practice, the resolution of complex crises demands a deep understanding of:
- a. Actors (conventional and irregular opponents, and a range of friendly, neutral and/or belligerent actors).
 - b. Operating environment, both psychological and physical (Individual and group motivations, objectives and other purposes, physical terrain).
 - c. Military and other tasks (with varying supporting/supported relationships).

Rather than discrete labelling of different types of operation, crises (and the military contribution to their resolution) can best be understood in terms of *who* is involved, *why* and *what* is happening. It then leads to an identification of *what*, *when* and *where* actions need to be taken. NATO commanders should therefore consider their situation carefully, and continuously monitor the framing of the problem and environment, to ensure that they establish and maintain an accurate understanding of the *'kind of war on which [NATO might be] embarking'*.

134. Military activity should be perceived to be, legitimate, proportional and appropriate in a broader sense. This is especially important during peace support operations PSO and other NA5CRO, where there is a perceived legitimacy of a mandate for action by NATO forces, and that perceived legitimacy is reinforced by the manner in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves. The best measure of effectiveness of this perception can be gauged by the extent to which factions and local populations consent to, comply with or resist the authority of the NATO forces executing the mandate and the extent to which the expectations and aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by the NATO forces executing the mandate.
135. The paragraphs that follow describe operational themes in terms of their underlying purpose, and associated military activity. That they appear in succession should not be interpreted as suggesting that they are sequential in practice.

Combat (Operations to Neutralise Major Threats)

138. Major combat operations may still be required in the direct defence of NATO against a major aggressor. This would normally involve conventional force-on-force combat of varying scale, frequency and intensity between opposing states' armed forces (that is to say, war fighting) where the armed forces of a state act principally to implement that state's national policy. States armed forces may also use irregular activities in order to support their conventional forces military objectives. Major combat operations may be further exacerbated, perpetuated, or exploited by irregular activists seeking to benefit from instability, whether through insurgency, terrorism, criminality or disorder.
139. Major combat tends to be characterised by a series of battles and major engagements, and therefore tends to be characterised by intense combat activity and logistic consumption. Particular emphasis is

placed upon maintaining freedom of action and denying that freedom to an enemy. The tempo of activities is usually high, with a need to prioritise resources and generate additional fighting power. Major combat operations more often than not involve large-scale manoeuvre by complex and multi-faceted joint forces, organised and commanded as functional components.

Security (Operations to Enable Stabilization)

140. The transition from combat operations to multi-agency stabilization operations (to re-establish security, stability and prosperity (underpinned by the rule of law)) is hugely important. It is likely to be characterised not by the achievement of specific end-states (such as absolute victory) but by incremental conditions-based outcomes (albeit they may reflect political direction to achieve particular goals according to a rough timetable). The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, will be highly dynamic. Conventional opponents, even once defeated, may re-appear or be reinforced by irregular activists; the threat they pose may need to be countered at the same time that legitimate indigenous governance and authority are being re-established. Pursuing the gradual transition towards stability, NATO commanders are likely to support the activities of other actors in protecting, strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law and the economy.
141. The long-term goal should be to resolve the underlying tensions that led to the inception or resurgence of conflict, and to create the conditions for successful longer-term development. The immediate contribution by NATO military forces, however, is likely to be to re-establish and maintain (sufficient) security for the local populace and civilian agencies to enable the stabilization process to advance. This will involve preventing or containing violence, and protecting people and key institutions. There will then be a need to promote those (largely political) processes which lead to lasting stability, through the development of indigenous capacity, rule of law and a robust civil society. The level of military activity required depends upon the context of the campaign and the ability of the other instruments of power and non-governmental organisations to operate with appropriate protection, despite perceived security risks.

Peace Support Operations

142. Peacekeeping follows an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The purpose is to sustain a situation that has already met the steady-state criteria established by international mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. Typical peacekeeping activities include interposition and protection, the interim management of selected civilian administration, and humanitarian assistance.
143. Peace enforcement is also predicated on the existence of a cease-fire or peace agreement, but the level of consent or compliance is uncertain, and the threat of disruption is considered to be high. Consequently, NATO military forces contributing to peace enforcement should be capable of applying credible coercive force, impartially, to ally the provisions of the peace agreement.

Other Activities

144. In addition, NATO forces are likely to be required to support a broad range of activities:
- a. **Security Sector Reform.** Security Sector Reform (SSR) involves reforming security institutions so that, under the control of a legitimate authority, they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. SSR can apply to any security institution, including police and militias, and may be preceded by Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). It encompasses: host nation defence ministry reform; training and development; education; and support for the enhancement of judicial and law enforcement institutions.
 - b. **Capacity Building.** Capacity building involves the enhancement of national and regional institutions in order to reinforce their credibility among, and authority over, an indigenous population. The aim is to cultivate sufficient authority within local, regional and national institutions that their governance becomes self-sustaining.
 - c. **Interim Governance.** Long-term governance must be indigenous. Where instability develops in ungoverned space, or an existing government has insufficient authority, then an intervention force may be needed to underpin some form of interim governance. The key will be to build authority, restore order, encourage respect for due political process, and then hand over to the indigenous authority as soon as possible. The precise form and function of governance institutions and the extent of any military contribution will be determined at NATO's strategic level (the North Atlantic Council (NAC)). In a comprehensive approach, SACEUR (as the military-strategic commander) will provide his operational level commander with direction on interim governance (including relevant objectives and the military contribution to them), agreed by the NAC, and where necessary by other relevant international institutions (e.g. the UN).
 - d. **Restoration of Essential Services.** In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, catastrophic incident or natural disaster when appropriate civil agencies may be unable to act quickly or operate with sufficient safety, the reconstitution of critical infrastructure and the restoration of essential services may fall to the military; within the means available. The aim is likely to be two-fold: to provide support to those in need, and to cement the support of the civil population. Services deemed essential will depend on the situation and the needs of the people. They may include the protection and/or restoration of medical care, the re-establishment of transportation systems, and the provision of potable water, electrical power and other utilities. As the security situation becomes more benign, non-military organisations (including indigenous ones) should (re-)assume responsibility for reconstruction, drawing upon international funding where appropriate.
 - e. **Military Outreach (MO).** Interaction with other international actors will provide NATO the opportunity to shape and influence ideas and values. MO builds trust builds host nation strategic options, builds trust and understanding and can prevent or support failing states. It can be delivered rapidly through contact and exercises with partners of choice.

CHAPTER 2 – CIMIC IN MISSION THEATRES AND OPERATIONS

0201. Definition and application of CIMIC

a. **Definition**

‘The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.’¹

b. **Application.** Four further factors condition the application of CIMIC:

- (1) CIMIC staffs are fully integrated into the commander’s headquarters (HQ), have full vision of and are authorised to coordinate CIMIC activities and projects in the JOA.
- (2) CIMIC activities form an integral part of the joint force commander’s plan, contribute to his mission and are related to implementing the overall strategy and contribution to achieving a stable and sustainable end-state.
- (3) NATO forces will seek to accommodate and support the activities of civil actors in achieving the agreed, shared end-state.
- (4) CIMIC activities are conducted with the purpose of transitioning responsibilities to the appropriate civil organizations or local authorities in a timely manner.

0202. **The aim of CIMIC**

The aim of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full cooperation of the civil actors with NATO forces to create civil military conditions that offer the commander the greatest possible moral, material, environmental and tactical advantages. (AJP-01(D))

0203. **The purpose of CIMIC**

The purpose of CIMIC is the support of a military contribution to a comprehensive approach whenever common goals for the military and the civil actors are defined, leading to interaction. In absence of agreed common goals, CIMIC will provide de confliction and

¹ Following guidance induced by AJP-01 a new definition for CIMIC is drafted for approval by NATO definition board. It reads as follows: “CIMIC is an integral part of the modern multidimensional operations that provides for the full spectrum of interaction with all influencing actors and the civil environment. CIMIC enables the NATO commander to create, influence and sustain conditions and to provide capabilities that will ensure obtaining operational objectives.”

harmonisation between military and civil conduct, resulting in interaction of a lesser proximity. In this case the focus is the avoidance of mutual interference, thus minimizing negative impact on the supported society. In consequence, this interaction might consist of, but is not limited to, coordination, cooperation, mutual support, coherent joint planning and information exchange, covering the political mandate; including NATO military forces, governance, and civil actors.

- a. **Background.** CIMIC is applicable to all types of NATO operations. In all conceivable scenarios commanders are increasingly required to take into account political, social, economic, cultural, religious, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting their operations. Furthermore, commanders recognise that operational areas contain the presence of a large number of civil actors with their own mandate, aims, methods, principles, structure, role and perspectives, that might have implications for operations and vice versa. The context and profile of CIMIC will alter according to the nature of the crisis or operation.

Three essential aspects of a Comprehensive Approach are identified:

- (1) Improving the application of the Alliance's own crisis management instruments.
- (2) Improving the Alliance's practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations, NGOs and local actors in the planning and conduct of operations.
- (3) Enhancing NATO's ability to bring military support to stabilisation activities and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict.

Operations governed by the use of mainly combat to achieve operational objectives might contain a different quantum of CIMIC interaction. The nature and the core functions of CIMIC remain the same. The broader spectrum of CIMIC might be found in stabilisation operations.

- b. **Relationships with Civil Actors.** Joint forces will usually seek to conduct operations in conjunction with civil actors, where the level of interaction will range from non-cooperation to coexistence to full cooperation. North Atlantic Council (NAC) will lay down the parameters for the involvement of military forces deployed on operations. Some of the conditions for military success can be achieved by harmonising the military commander's aims and methods with those of the civil actors. In a complex operation, involving major civilian elements and a civilian political head of mission, the military campaign plan or operation plan (OPLAN) will be one of several functional plans. This involvement also includes concerted and integrated planning mechanisms at the strategic level. CIMIC is the Commander's tool for establishing, maintaining and expanding these relationships.

Challenges will be enhanced by the presence of the media and the expectations of both the international and local communities. In a hostile environment or a high intensity conflict it may be impossible to achieve harmony with all actors and the requirements of the military mission. In these situations, CIMIC will mitigate against undesired effects.

0204. Detailed tasks of CIMIC

- (1) CIMIC is to interact with the appropriate civil actors on behalf of the NATO commander to accomplish the mission.
- (2) The long-term effect of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will contribute to the achievement of objectives within the overall mission, and to the implementation of a successful military end state. The mid-term purpose is to link the short term and the long term purposes in a friction free way.

In accomplishing those tasks CIMIC staff will:

- (a) Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at the appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonisation, information sharing, integrated planning and conduct of operations.
- (b) Identify and explain military goals, objectives, and concepts of operation (within appropriate operational security (OPSEC) and classified material release guidance) with civil actors.
- (c) Facilitate concurrent, parallel, and where possible integrated planning between the joint force and friendly civil actors. When and where possible participate in civilian planning and assessment groups, teams, or cells.
- (d) Integrate with other staff branches on all aspects of operations.
- (e) Continuously evaluate the operational environment, including local needs and capability gaps to resolve issues.
- (f) Work towards a timely and smooth transition of responsibilities to the proper civil authorities.
- (g) Advise the Commander on all of the above.
- (h) Share information with all staff branches.

0205. The core functions of CIMIC

a. **Civil-Military Liaison**

Establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonisation, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations. This includes:

- (1) Timely identification of relevant actors.
- (2) Development of a liaison structure (Formatted and frequently updated).
- (3) Organization of CIMIC information.

b. **Support to the Force**

Commanders, depend on the circumstances, will require significant support from within their JOA as well as coordination of effort to minimise disruption to military operation. For that reason CIMIC plays a proactive role by contributing to operational planning and participating in operations. This includes:

- (1) Provision² of information on the civil situation.
- (2) Provide assessed civil situation picture.
- (3) Evaluate civil situation, identify civil key indicators and sensitive factors having a critical impact on the conduct of operations as well as the impact of the military situation influencing the civil environment.
- (4) Recommend military activities to mitigate the critical impact.
- (5) Conduct CIMIC activities including CIMIC projects. CIMIC projects is part of CIMIC activities and is the conduct of projects, whether of a quick impact or a long term impact nature, whenever the civil partners are unable to comply to needs of the civil environment.
- (6) Promote force acceptance.
- (7) Contribute to influencing the civil society in the mission area.
- (8) Facilitate access to civilian resources, when needed.

² Provision consists of the gathering, assessing and displaying of information regarding the civil environment.

c. **Support to Civil Actors and their environment**

Within a comprehensive approach, military support to civil actors and their environment will generally only be conducted, if it is required to create conditions supportive for the accomplishment of the military mission within the context of the mandate and may include a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Enabling this is a role of CIMIC and it may be executed by all elements of the military. A staggered approach in support should follow:

- (1) Enabling support by means of capacity building.
- (2) Support by means of capacity sharing.
- (3) Support by military means only (as a last resort).

0206. The components of CIMIC

a. **General.** In order to achieve all of the above, NATO needs a dedicated CIMIC capability. This capability exists when the following four components are in place:

- (1) Policy, doctrine and concepts.
- (2) The understanding, will and capacity to utilise doctrine and concepts.
- (3) CIMIC assets in the form of selected, trained and competent personnel and Joint elements (land, sea and air) are present in the mission theatre.
- (4) Appropriate logistical support of infrastructures.

b. **The conceptual.** The conceptual aspect of CIMIC encompasses policy, doctrine, planning and procedures throughout NATO commands and includes the supervision and coordination of CIMIC during training and operations.

c. **Training, education, exercises, experimentation, conduct and general awareness.** The training aspects of the CIMIC capability covers, but is not limited to, courses, presentations, conferences and seminars as well as the lessons learned process. Most important is the full integration of CIMIC in NATO exercises and experiments, therefore rooting it into operational conduct.

d. **Physical resources.** The physical aspect of CIMIC capability comprises the resources the commander allocates to the conduct of CIMIC, its related activities in a given situation. Because situations differ, the composition of CIMIC assets cannot be prescriptive. However CIMIC staff must populate all HQ levels. Their role is to advise the commander, participate in joint planning to prepare and develop the

CIMIC assessment and the CIMIC lines of activity in support of the commander's plan, while also conducting liaison. As a result, military forces may be tasked to assist and contribute to CIMIC projects. There may also be a requirement to deploy additional CIMIC assets into theatre. These will fall into three categories:

- (1) **CIMIC groups, CIMIC units and CIMIC elements.** CIMIC groups, CIMIC units and elements are bespoke to the mission and provide a structured organization, appropriately resourced and equipped, to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the mission. Their size and deployment duration will be determined by both the task and by how quickly the appropriate civil actors and structures can be established.
- (2) **Functional Specialists (FS).** FS are deployed because a specific requirement for their expertise has been identified. They may come from a wide range of sources and are not necessarily military personnel. They may be required to assist in the planning process or to conduct CIMIC projects.
- (3) **Fiscal planning.** The execution of CIMIC projects and other CIMIC activities in need of a budget require a detailed fiscal planning upfront of the conduct. It is clearly into national authority to adhere to planning modules of the donating entities. However this does not imply that any such action does not have to be concerted, harmonised and fitting into the overall mission.

CHAPTER 3 – THE PRINCIPLES OF CIMIC

0301. General

CIMIC principles fall into two broad categories:

- a. Principles governing the military direction of CIMIC. These principles guide the internal military processes, enabling the design and conduct of the CIMIC component within a comprehensive approach.
- b. Principles governing the Civil-Military Relationship. These principles underpin the effective civil-military relationships.

0302. Principles of CIMIC

- a. Understand the context and environmental awareness

(1) **Cultural context.** Military operations now take place within a wider political and civil context than before, and commanders are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting those operations. The scale and nature of the risks and challenges within this multinational, multi-agency environment requires greater understanding of and emphasis on CIMIC at all levels of operation.

The present operational environment is likely to be complex, unstable and unpredictable. Military success alone will achieve little beyond containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil actors are created. In the majority of operations, intolerance to collateral damage (both in terms of casualties and materiel), damage to the environment and legal issues will all be constraining factors in the conduct of operations.

Short-term success may be undermined in the mid and long term by thoughtless violation of traditional cultural practices, which could lead to the loss of legitimacy by the military forces. CIMIC plays a vital role as one of major advisors to the commander and in ensuring mission relevant cultural competence of the forces through education and training. A prerequisite is to be settled firmly into one's own cultural identity, by knowing its principles and having understood its mechanisms.

(2) **Assess the different actors involved.** The civil actors addressing the conditions and circumstances of any given conflict or crisis situation will have varying mandates, competencies and capacities. The complex dynamics and inter-relationships of these actors will blur boundaries. All actors, both military and civil, involved in an area operations will have an influence on those operations and so will

create an effect, both on the operational environment and on the activities of the other involved actors.

- b. Understand the aims and objectives of the military and civil actors
- (1) **Unity of effort.** Civil-Military Liaison is the key aspect of CIMIC in providing the necessary interaction to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of coherent, and where necessary integrated, activity. Such liaison early in the planning process and throughout the conduct of an operation provides the basis for a greater unity of effort and coherence in effect. Whilst liaison is a two-way process, military forces invariably have greater capacity for liaison than civil actors and as such are normally able to take the initiative in establishing liaison mechanisms which help to establish a effective overall unity of effort. In the case of the humanitarian sector consideration may need to be given to conducting this liaison away from formal military establishments in order to preserve the ‘humanitarian space’ of non-military actors.
- (2) **Synchronize effects.** The synchronization of military and civilian resources have the potential to open up communities which have formerly been isolated or dominated and effects of civil-military coordination will allow for synchronize security, governance and development approaches, creating a potential positive domino effect.
- (3) **Pursue common goals.** Establishing, maintaining and strengthening civil-military relationships is critical to success in an operational environment. Although the various entities operating within a JOA may have different mission, NATO forces and civil actors should identify common goals wherever possible and work toward them. Depending on the depth of common goals the bandwidth will vary from only minor common goals to complete unity of effort. Each participating organization shall understand the political and resource commitments required. This understanding forms the basis of civil-military relationship in a common effort to reach the desired end state.
- c. Operate within the law
- (1) **Fulfil legal obligations.** Commanders have a legal responsibility to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law. While fulfilling these legal requirements, commanders should always seek, within the constraints of the mission, to reduce the effect of military operations on and where possible facilitate maximum support for non-combatants. Detailed advice on such obligations can be sought from the Legal Advisor (LEGAD). CIMIC significantly contributes to the JTFC’s “Fulfilment of Legal Obligations.”

(2) **Be humanitarian aware.** Regardless of the type of operation, a complex civil sector will be part of the problem and equally, part of the solution. The military commander will require a clear picture of the civil administration (whether this be sovereign or failed) including such aspects as police, local government, emergency services, utilities etc. The population within an Area of Operations will have its ethnic and religious groupings, cultural differences and allegiances. The type and degree of co-operation and coordination between the military and various civilian organisations will vary depending on the type of civil organisation (and in some cases the particular organisation).

d. Gain respect and trust

(1) **Interaction.** The ethos, structure and working practices of the civil actors with whom the Joint Force must interact are extremely diverse. As in a multi-national environment developing respect and trust will take time and effort, requiring a broad, coherent and consistent approach. The most effective way for military forces to understand the skills, knowledge and capabilities of IOs and NGOs is to establish and maintain relationships before entering an area of operations. This requires joint multi-agency activity within the training regime. Civil agencies can also use such relationships to develop an understanding of how effective liaison with the military can benefit civil goals.

(2) **Transparency.** Tension between political, military, humanitarian and other components of a civil-military relationship will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding at times and may be aggravated by political bias, media inaccuracy or distortion, and poor communications. At the civil-military interface, there is a need to demonstrate openness, competence, capability and resolve in order to win the respect, trust and confidence of all elements of the civil environment and so engender successful civil-military relationships.

(3) **Legality.** It has to be absolutely unambiguous that the Alliances' Forces will remain within the framework of their mandate and their rights and obligations agreed by the mandating authority. This framework might need explanations to non-NATO-actors in the area.

e. Civilian primacy and ownership

(1) **Reduce dependency.** The undertaking of tasks and activities in the civil environment merely to employ spare capacity or generate a 'feel good' factor can create unbalanced perceptions, both local and international, of the military mission. It may also lead to long-term dependency on military resources, rendering both military disengagement and follow on civilian activity more difficult. It is important to develop a culture of ownership and 'self help' within the local population. Any military activity carried out in the civil environment should use the minimum

resources necessary to achieve the task. This approach will assist the JTFC in guarding against the inadvertent creation of this long-term dependency.

(2) **Plan for transition to civilian ownership.** The military commander should do everything in his power to encourage the promotion of co-operation to achieve economy and unity of effort. This includes transition planning for handover of responsibilities to civilian entities. When the military is directed to perform in place of civil actors, it is important to pre-plan the transition to civil ownership as early as possible. Examples include but are not limited to ensuring the rule of law, conducting good governance, fulfilling vital roles of the civil administration, public health, and infrastructure.

(3) **Plan for exit strategy.** Consideration of the long-term effects of military activities and advising commanders and staffs of the consequences. This becomes most important considering a transition and exit strategy. Each single action of the military as well as most of the civil actors should be focused on leaving the area as soon as possible while ensuring a maximum positive impact on the situation that led to the deployment of forces and the commitment of civil actors. This demands a close connection and harmonization of all action with a development strategy for the area and a detailed plan on when to exit the area.

f. Integrated planning

(1) **Prioritisation.** Following a commonly agreed development strategy, or help-agenda, consequently leads to a prioritization of actions to be conducted. This prioritization needs to be harmonized and de-conflicted throughout the commitment of Alliances Forces to generate optimized effects.

(2) **Synchronization.** To optimize the desired effects each action of the military and the civil actors should be as much synchronized as possible to multiply the positive impact.

(3) **Resource management.** The military may undertake tasks and activities on the Civil-Military Line of Operation of the Campaign Plan, under the commander's direction and using Joint Force resources and/or local resources facilitated by the Joint Force. A wide range of Joint Forces can be involved information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. This activity will clearly have an effect on the civil environment, and will benefit from specialist advice, co-ordination, professional resource management. CIMIC facilitates this advice and co-ordination

g. Effective communication

- (1) **Strategic Communication.** Effective communication between military commanders and their national and international political and policy decision making bodies; as well as maintaining the operational Civil-Military interface relationship between military commanders and national, governmental authorities; active international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); and the civilian population of countries within the Joint Operations Area (JOA), and even on the tactical level, at which interaction between the military and civilian sectors takes place on the ground, will be vital in applying the foregoing principles; maintaining consent, generating the necessary level of understanding and co-operation. Civil actors with whom the Joint Force will deal are likely to pursue their own priorities. Indeed, some may take the view that co-operation with the Joint Force and their own independence are mutually exclusive. The key to minimising these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication. The positioning of facilities to establish and maintain this requirement needs to be carefully considered. There is a balance to be struck between accessibility for civil actors, force protection and operations security (OPSEC). If placed ‘inside the wire’ the effectiveness of communication measures may be compromised by the perceptions of civil actors and their need to be, and seen to be, independent, impartial and neutral. Comprehensiveness is only achievable if all levels of responsibility are communicating. The generated effects of this horizontal and vertical communication will facilitate the most friction-free cooperation in the mission area.
- (2) **Resources.** All communication equipment has to be interoperable not only within the Alliances Forces but also wherever possible with all civil actors cooperating with the Alliance. This is a basic, and vital, precondition for a comprehensive approach to achieving any mission success .
- (3) **Capability.** A key part of the military’s mission is also in restoring communications to civilian first responders across the area of operations, and eventually to restore the original communications system to the civilian population. Communicational capabilities are not limited to devices, but have to be seen as the cross-entity capability to successfully exchange data anytime and anywhere.
- (4) **Network.** Effective civil-military communication needs an enlarged network to facilitate communication in omni-directional way. This is the general guidance for developing a network plan, based on the enhanced liaison matrix.

CHAPTER 4 – CIMIC PLANNING AND EXECUTION

0401. General

- a. **Relationships between NATO and civil actors.** In order to harmonise the contribution of the NATO forces and civil actors working in a mission theatre, it is necessary to develop an effective relationship between them, contributing to a comprehensive approach. CIMIC is the commander's tool for building these relationships within his JOA. These relationships will be supported by those established between NATO and respective civil actors at Strategic Command level and higher. Although institutional relationships between NATO HQs and certain civil actors will exist, there may also be less formal relations, based upon working knowledge of respective planning mechanisms and joint training activities. Following a comprehensive approach these relations will assist adequate integrated planning at the strategic level prior to and during an operation, therefore reducing the challenges of solitary military planning.
- b. **CIMIC and the civilian factors of an operational environment.** CIMIC plays an important role across the spectrum of NATO operations. It contributes towards the establishment of a stable environment within which the mission may be completed more easily. Indeed, a force may be at least partially dependent on civil actors for resources and information, and might rely on civil authorities to provide security in certain areas. It may be impossible to gain full freedom of action and movement without the cooperation of these civil actors. CIMIC personnel play a central role assessing the immediate as well as long term needs of the local population and the capabilities of both the local government and civilian organizations. Assessments will be key to operational planning, meeting immediate local needs, and achieving stabilisation and for transition to full civilian authority. The effects of military action on the civil environment should be considered at all stages of an operation. CIMIC personnel will identify the effects of these actions to maintain civil support. Civil and military planning efforts should be coherent, de-conflicted and where possible transparent at all stages.

0402. **CIMIC as a Joint Function.** CIMIC is an integral part of missions, spanning from humanitarian emergency to armed conflict. Through CIMIC the commander will rely on links with the civil actors. The force is unlikely to gain full freedom of action and movement without interaction but establishing good relations might also deny the same advantages to hostile or potentially hostile forces. CIMIC's contribution to other joint functions³ is crucial. Examples include but are not limited to:

- a. Joint Targeting

³ For further details refer to AJP-01(D).

- b. Joint Planning
- c. Information Operations
- d. Joint Assessment
- e. Continuous information – and knowledge acquisition
- f. Public Affairs

0403. **CIMIC Assessments.** Situational competence⁴ is a vital element for mission success. It may heavily rely on CIMIC contribution in the form of frequent, detailed and accurate assessments of the civil environment in the area. These assessments will provide a civil situation picture enabling all command levels in NATO to understand the situation and better inform future decisions and coherent planning. Monitoring progress is aided through the adoption of commonly understood procedures and techniques. Therefore, organization and planning for, as well as the conduct of CIMIC assessments will be performed as part of the overall assessment process. To shape and execute this process CIMIC and other experts from all required staff functions cooperate under the lead of the HQ's assessment element to provide an integrated assessment function.⁵

0404. CIMIC in planning

- a. At the operational level, joint campaign planning follows a specific operational planning process (OPP). It is essential that CIMIC representatives are an integral part of the OPP and members of the joint operations planning capacity or equivalent.
 - (1) Furthermore, other members of the operational level CIMIC staff not only support its representatives in the joint operations planning capacity but also perform non-planning related CIMIC activities that include establishing a network outside the JOA that can provide expertise thus supporting the operation from outside the JOA.
 - (2) CIMIC staff also needs to be included in theatre reconnaissance from the start to ensure the availability of an up-to-date assessment of the civil situation.
- b. CIMIC staff activities and contribution to an OPP include:
 - (1) In an operational appreciation and assessment process the broad direction of the CIMIC focus and is to determine what critical issues are to be identified.

⁴ Awareness implies knowledge gained through one's own perception or by means of information. Competence implies the state or quality of being adequately or well qualified to act or react in specific situations. (Source: The American heritage dictionary of the English language)

⁵ For further details refer to AJP-5.

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Those results that are of interest to all the participants in the joint operations planning capacity will be documented in a CIMIC initial estimate.

- (2) During an operational orientation the aim is to ensure that all influencing civil factors that have military implications are included in an overall comprehensive plan.⁶ In this way CIMIC contributes to a mission analysis (the 'desired end-state', 'mission statement' etc). As information is made available the CIMIC initial estimate is updated and improved versions will be produced, resulting in a comprehensive CIMIC estimate.
- (3) During operational concept development CIMIC contributes to operational design and the description of operational objectives. CIMIC evaluates the potentially critical impact on the conduct of planned operations to recommend activities to mitigate that impact and vice versa. CIMIC contributions to each course of action (COA) will be developed and specific concerns will be shared with the joint operations planning capacity and the commander. The ORM in regard to CIMIC objectives, effects and tasks will be incorporated into the planning synchronisation matrix to be linked up with the lines of operation designed during concept development. This process identifies likely civil-related objectives, and the requirement for both direct support military CIMIC forces and for dedicated CIMIC Forces. The requirement for forces is captured in the combined joint status of requirement (CJSOR).
- (4) In an operational plan development all civil-related issues and tasks will be included in an Operational Plan (OPLAN), the Lines of Activity will be established. Also the tasks for CIMIC assets will be listed in the OPLAN and should covering the three core functions of CIMIC. CIMIC personnel is to prepare the CIMIC input to the OPLAN. They will ensure that factors relating to the civil dimension are incorporated into all aspects of planning. Inputs will be based, where possible on reconnaissance, detailed assessments and input from country/area studies and open source information. These inputs will include:
 - (a) Political and cultural history, including tribal matters;
 - (b) The state of national and local government;
 - (c) Civil administration and services;
 - (d) The needs of the local population;

⁶ This overall plan consists, under the best of all circumstances, of a military part including the civil implications and a civil plan including the military implications.

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- (e) Population movement (internally displaced person [IDP] and refugees, situation);
 - (f) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of applicable civil actors;
 - (g) Civil infrastructure;
 - (h) Economy and commerce;
 - (i) The mind-set and perceptions of the civilian population.
- (5) In an operational direction, campaign assessment, plan adaption and transition phase CIMIC will deliver branch-plans and sequels to reflect on operational changes (contribution to contingency planning). Next to this CIMIC personnel will feed in all information from the civil environment (documented as assessments or as an update of a comprehensive CIMIC estimate) that influences the OPLAN to identify and address necessary changes.
- (6) Implementation of a comprehensive strategic communication process is critical to CIMIC success. This process engages all aspects of a JFC's information operations plan and responsibilities. Subordinate commanders employ a strategic communication plan to ensure early and continuous coordination so their messages are not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the joint force or compromise the essential elements of friendly information. These CIMIC capabilities make significant contributions to information operations and must always be coordinated and synchronized. For this reason, the public affairs, CIMIC, and information operations staffs must work in close coordination during planning and execution.

0405. CIMIC in execution⁷

a. Specific issues in CIMIC execution:

- (1) **CIMIC projects.** CIMIC projects consists of project based reconstruction and development efforts. At certain stages of an ORM, when a lack of security and safety prevents civil actors from operating or there are shortfalls in civil actor capacity, the military component may be requested to contribute to reconstruction and development efforts. The planning as well as the conduct has to be executed following broad guidance issued by the strategic level, and operationalised at the operational level.

⁷ For further detail regarding integration of CIMIC into the operational conduct refer to AJP-3

- (2) **CIMIC and intelligence.** The work of CIMIC personnel at the tactical level generates large amounts of information that when processed with other related information may result in intelligence. In all probability, this information would be available to the general public and should not be construed by civil actors that it was collected covertly.
- (a) Civil actors are opposed to contributing to military intelligence gathering; any attempt to use civil actors for this purpose will result in lasting discord and tension thereby reducing cooperation and movement towards the desired end state. It also prevents effective CIMIC contribution to the overall mission. The need to share information with civil actors is by far more beneficial for a comprehensive approach than the former ‘need to know’ policy.
- (b) The military should refrain from over classifying information, attempting to de-classify as much information as possible, thus assisting civil actors in performing their activities. For this purpose the procedures to follow have to be in accordance with the NATO security policy as described in the supporting document on ‘Information and intelligence sharing with non NATO entities’.⁸ This also enhances the overall information sharing process that will allow more information to be provided to civil actors.
- (3) **CIMIC Contribution to the full range of operations.** CIMIC remains valid across all operations, principles remain the same but the focus of effort may change.
- (4) **Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).** CEP in NATO refers to the development of collective plans for the systematic and effective use of Alliance civil resources at national and NATO levels in support of Alliance strategy. The focus of Civil Emergency Planning is the protection of vulnerable, modern societies against the effects of emergency situations (crisis, war or peacetime emergencies such as disasters).

The NATO Civil Emergency Planning organization consists of four basic elements: The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which reports directly to the NAC; eight technical Planning Boards & Committees (PB&Cs); the CEP staff supporting the SCEPC and the PB&Cs; and the Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

The Assistant Secretary General responsible for the Operations Division is also the Chairman of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in Plenary Session.

⁸ See Reference Publications.

The Civil Emergency Planning section, under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Civil Emergency Planning and Exercises who is the Chairman of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in Permanent Session, is responsible for:

- (a) The coordination and guidance of planning aimed at the rapid transition of peacetime economies of the nations of the Alliance to an emergency footing.
- (b) Development of the arrangements for the use of civil resources in support of Alliance defence and for the protection of civil populations.
- (c) Providing staff support to the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and the eight civil emergency planning boards and committees responsible for developing crisis management arrangements in the areas of civil sea, land and air transport; energy; industry; food and agriculture; civil communication; medical care/ and civil protection.
- (d) Policy for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) which coordinates international responses to requests for assistance from or on behalf of a nation stricken by disaster.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Civil Emergency Planning and Exercises also oversees civil emergency planning activities undertaken in the context of the EAPC, Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group.

- (5) **Host Nation Support (HNS).** CIMIC contributes to HNS by assessing the implications of military involvement on the local economy and establishing interaction with civil actors in cases where de-confliction and harmonisation between military and civil needs is required. For specifics according interaction with the host nation refer to chapter 2, paragraph 0204. De-confliction activity will be conducted by the relevant personnel. For a detailed description of military relations in HNS refer to AJP-4 and AJP-4.5.
- (6) **Challenges of staff procedures resulting from civil military liaison.** CIMIC provides a conduit for information exchange between civil and military actors. This generates specific challenges for the staff and requires well developed procedures to fulfil this function in a manner that is both effective and well understood. It also demands an understanding of the other processes in use by civil actors.

- (7) **Military-to-military interaction.** In case of non-alliance forces operating in the same area it is advisable to de-conflict and harmonise CIMIC efforts between NATO and non NATO forces. This is not a CIMIC task alone and must be coordinated by the JFC. Likewise CIMIC activities in the area should be coordinated at the tactical level to avoid duplication of effort or disruptive procedures. This also includes areas where CIMIC contributes, for instance, strategic communication (STRATCOM)) and targeting.
- (8) **Civilian actors advisor (CIVAD).** Tailored to the mission, independent on the level of military activities being positioned at the strategic, operational or tactical level, civil expertise in direct support of the commanding officer will most probably be found. This is not limited to the cultural or political sector as many areas of the civil environment might be qualified as the key area of concern. Those experts need to be in closest connection with the CIMIC personnel at their level. It is responsibility of the head of CIMIC to coordinate all efforts going into the civil direction. Resulting from that the contribution of the civil advisory personnel to CIMIC needs to be harmonised.

b. **CIMIC Tasks.** The following sections outline likely CIMIC tasks.

Although CIMIC requires very special skills to contribute to the commander's mission, the basic military skills of each soldier remain of the utmost importance in the conduct of CIMIC. Constant vigilance and self protection skills is the key for survivability in any mission area. The unique nature of each operation will require commanders to create specific solutions to let CIMIC promote the military contribution to a comprehensive approach.

c. **Members of the Alliance and other Troop Contributors should:**

- (1) Consider CIMIC during the planning process and implement it into directives and planning documents.
- (2) Develop plans and programs in line with NATO CIMIC policy and doctrine.
- (3) Ensure, within their capabilities and overall priorities, that information, research and analysis are provided in support of NATO CIMIC.
- (4) Ensure interoperability is taken into consideration during development and procurement of CIMIC capabilities.
- (5) Include CIMIC in education, training and exercises.
- (6) Provide resources and trained personnel to support NATO CIMIC in operations and exercises.

d. **Strategic Level tasks in support of operations should:**

- (1) Ensure CIMIC contribution to all stages of planning.
- (2) Advise the commander and staff on the civil situation in the mission theatre and the implications of military operations on the civil environment and vice versa.
- (3) Issue direction and guidance to subordinate HQs on the conduct of pre-deployment CIMIC activities.
- (4) Ensure effective communication with civil actors:
 - (a) Dissemination of regular assessments and reports, the frequency of which will be determined by the Commander.
 - (b) Collection, analysis and dissemination of civil actor reports and information.
 - (c) Attendance at key actors' meetings.
 - (d) Exchange of liaison personnel with key civil actors.⁹
 - (e) Enable information sharing with civil actors, focussed on partnership and common interests.
- (5) Provide expert advice when preparing agreements with civil actors.
- (6) Coordinate with the information operations staff to contribute to the development of an information operation plan designed to inform audiences about CIMIC and to release information for influencing certain groups important to consent with the military contribution. Those could consist, but are not limited to the local population of the mission area (winning hearts and minds).
- (7) Plan and prepare for transition.

e. **Joint Command Level and subordinate echelons**

- (1) **Joint force Commanders and their eventual substructure should:**
 - (a) Provide competent CIMIC staff personnel to assist in training, education and exercises.

⁹ e.g.: military liaison personnel permanently detached to civil actors and vice versa.

- (b) Should play a proactive role in standardising CIMIC skills within their areas.
 - (c) Promulgate appropriate directives and guidance, including planning guidelines and contribution to planning activity.
 - (d) Conduct CIMIC assessments and use them in the operational planning.
 - (e) Issue guidance on CIMIC training standards and input to exercises.
 - (f) Ensure appropriate liaison with the HQ in the JOA.
- (2) **Mission Theatre Commanders should:**
- (a) Ensure CIMIC staff are provided with commander's direction and guidance, able to develop guidance for subordinate level.
 - (b) Ensure the use of NATO CIMIC doctrine and develop theatre specific CIMIC procedures.
 - (c) Ensure CIMIC input is included in planning.
 - (d) Ensure CIMIC is conducted in support of the mission.
 - (e) Ensure national or multi-national CIMIC assets are integrated.
 - (f) Ensure CIMIC content in pre-deployment exercises (e.g. familiarisation or mission rehearsal exercises).
 - (g) Plan and prepare for transition.

f. **Tactical Level**

- (1) General Tasks
 - (a) Use of provided CIMIC assets.
 - (b) Establishment of CIMIC facilities (if applicable).
 - (c) Conduct CIMIC projects (see 0305 a (1)) and all other CIMIC activities laid out in the operational plan.
- (2) Potential Specific Tasks
 - (a) Pre Operational Stage

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- Assess the civil situation in the mission theatre and contribute to the common operational picture.
 - Assist in the assessment and planning of contingency planning and exercises. Work with all other staff branches to ensure that all civil related factors are incorporated into the planning process.
 - Use existing relationships with civil actors to conduct integrated planning.
 - Provide advice on the civil situation and the effect of military operations on the civilian population and organizations and vice versa.
 - Prepare educational material for the force on likely civil conditions and brief staff re-enforcements.
 - Train and educate CIMIC personnel and integrate CIMIC in pre-deployment training.
 - Determine commander's critical information requirements and promulgate to NATO commands and contributing nations with collection capabilities.
 - Establish and maintain the exchange of information with civil actors. Civilian sources will often provide information of operational relevance. Subject to security considerations, it is likely to be of mutual benefit to pass information in both directions. When the military will provide unclassified information, relevant security information must be declassified
 - Plan and prepare for transition.
- (b) Operational Stage
- Continue those pre-operational tasks that are enduring.
 - Conduct CIMIC activities and projects. CIMIC activities may need to fill any vacuum¹⁰ or capability gaps not filled left by civil actors. These activities may consist of the provision of

¹⁰ This vacuum or gaps will have arisen due to the mandated civil actor's or International Community's temporary inability to fulfil these needs. Any activities of this nature will be performed within limitations and capabilities and will be conducted within the context of a plan for transition of such responsibilities to the mandated authorities. Donors for some activities may have to be identified.

services or facilities required to meet the immediate life sustaining needs of the local population and/or to ensure the stability and long-term sustainability of the society within the JOA.

- Provide continuous assessments of the capabilities and tasks of civil organizations delivering effect in the JOA along with assessments of the needs of the population and the progress of certain aspects of the mission. These assessments will include the dimension of any civil vacuum and the identification or adjustment of milestones concerning transition of civil responsibilities.
 - Contribute to mission planning at all stages of the operational planning process.
 - Conduct coherent planning with civil actors and ensure mutual information flow. This also includes contribution to CEP.
 - Enable communications between logistics staff functions and potential contractors and partners in theatre (supportive contribution to HNS).
 - Communicate with applicable civil actors. The commander will normally be in communication with local political, civic, and religious leaders and the heads of mandated civil actors. Equally, CIMIC liaison officers are likely to be deployed to the latter.
 - Plan and prepare for transition.
- (c) Transition Stage. The primary role of CIMIC in the transition stage is to assist civil authorities in operating without NATO forces in the JOA. This includes, but is not limited to:
- Finalize the operational stage tasks, cease performing any functions that are no longer necessary, embellished by improved stability in the area.
 - Execute plans for the transition of responsibilities and functions to civil actors.
 - As the military force reduces both in size and in the scope of its responsibilities, CIMIC will continue to assist the transfer

of any civilian responsibilities that the force may have assumed.

- Final hand-over of civil related functions and/or responsibilities to the proper mandated civil actors, in as smooth and seamless a manner as possible.

g. **CIMIC Assets.** CIMIC personnel need to be present at each level of the NATO command and force structure. The primary role of CIMIC at these levels is to inform the commander on the impact of the civil environment on military operations and vice versa. The management task implied in that action defines the benefit CIMIC is able to generate for the complete mission.

(1) **CIMIC Staff Personnel.** CIMIC staff personnel is trained in NATO staff procedures and NATO CIMIC at all command levels, either as a complete joint staff branch or integrated in other staff branches. At these levels CIMIC staff personnel may part of a planning cell, an operations cell, a liaison cell, a head of department or be multiple advisors in direct support of the commander (e.g. Cultural Advisor, Civil Advisor). The staff is mission tailored, with particular focus on the transitional phase.

(2) **CIMIC Personnel at the Tactical Level.** The organizational structure, from brigade level HQ down, needs to be mission tailored. Generally there is a CIMIC unit (CU) at brigade level and an appropriate number of CIMIC elements in the field.¹¹ It is of utmost importance that those mostly national CIMIC elements perform their task according to NATO procedures. Command relationship of the CU must ensure national caveats but attach NATO operational command (OPCOM) or NATO tactical control (TACON) authorities for the supported commander to address the dynamic civil environment.

(a) **CIMIC units.** The CIMIC unit is organised to provide staff augmentation with planning, operations, liaison, and analysis capability as part of its headquarters element. It also may include CIMIC elements that are normally attached to the subordinate manoeuvre components of the supported headquarters.

(b) **CIMIC elements.** The CIMIC element should be headed by an experienced leader, familiar with NATO procedures, who guides CIMIC team assessments, councils the liaison function and supervises reporting. The number of CIMIC teams in a CE is mission dependent.

¹¹ The CU can be the first multinational CIMIC asset. The CIMIC element is to be considered as national troop contribution of a non-multinational character.

- (c) **Military Forces in direct support of CIMIC.** In the absence of CIMIC assets or additionally, non CIMIC military forces can be employed in direct support of CIMIC projects (e.g. Engineers reconstructing infrastructure, medical support and capacity building). As the main focus of such troops is not support to CIMIC their employment should be as limited as possible and their employment requires direction and guidance from CIMIC staff.
- (3) **Functional Specialists.** Functional specialists are employed to conduct specific tasks that have been identified by the assessment process. Their number and area of expertise will vary according to both need and availability. They should only be employed for the duration of the specified task. These specialists may be either military or civilian.

0406. CIMIC related funding

- a. **General.** Effective allocation of finances is critical to the success of any campaign. Pending the nature and circumstances of the operation, a variety of funding mechanisms can support the mission. Typically, there could be a NATO common funded portion and nationally funded portion and some form of joint or multinational funding. It is important to ensure adequate fiscal planning before the mission is commenced. Budgets should be devised, credits granted and a financial should control this while also providing advice to the commander. In practice the financial dimensions of NATO operations normally develop as a series of options and respective funds. An inability to negotiate or influence these issues may seriously inhibit the commander and adversely impact the mission. Effective allocation of financial resources and staff to handle related issues will ensure effective support to the operation.
- b. **Funding and approval of CIMIC related projects.** There are two main types of funding for CIMIC projects – national funding and grants to NATO operational level command entities. National level funding in the mission theatre should be coordinated through the respective J9 to de-conflict and harmonise all projects efforts at the appropriate level. Management of the funds and contracting is normally retained with the comptroller. Approval levels for varying funding programmes may be retained by each national contributor and through the headquarters allocated programme. Each funding programme may also have varying approval levels whereby the commander must retain or delegate approval authority to his subordinate commanders. Interoperability between J9, comptroller, and subordinate commanders and staffs is imperative for seamless integration of all available funding for CIMIC.
 - (1) **National funding for CIMIC related projects.** It is recognized that National funding has associated caveats that must be adhered to. Nothing in

this document will supersede or override these caveats. However, National CIMIC assets utilizing national funding must coordinate their projects with the appropriate J9 branch at JOA HQ level in line with the commander's intent while also consulting with relevant civil actors and field commanders..

- (2) **Funds for JOA HQ for CIMIC Related Projects.** When funds are received from other parties (e.g. donors) they remain the responsibility of the commander. CIMIC assets are tasked to develop and plan CIMIC projects activities following the commander's intent. Subsequent CIMIC echelons shall apply for funds on completion of the planning phase.
- c. **CIMIC projects activities during transition.** From the outset of delivering CIMIC projects activities it is essential to plan for the transition of activities back to the appropriate civil actors. To prevent loss of focus, all stages of CIMIC projects should consider transition in their planning. However, CIMIC projects has to fulfil the requirements below:
- (1) Consultation with civil actors to validate the need assessment and establish requirements, followed by the development of a collaborative plan on how to deliver support.
 - (2) Sustainable on completion with no further support required from the military.
 - (3) Military funding should cease after transition.
 - (4) Projects activity shall be closely controlled and monitored according to the plan, especially in relation to fiscal controls, military resources involved and the timeframe.
 - (5) Documentation of projects activity, including lessons learned. This documentation needs to imply the add-on value created by the projects, together with a concise description of used resources and best practice.

0407. Lessons Learned

The implementation of Alliance strategy, the success of its missions and its transformation requires the continuous improvement of internal procedures, interoperability and military effectiveness. The Lessons Learned (LL) process is an important tool that supports commanders analyse the issue, inform enhancements while recording and communicating best practice.

Lessons Learned, including best practices, have to be captured and implemented to improve all CIMIC related issues including education, training, procedures (including TTPs/Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs)), and doctrine development. Therefore, the content of the Lessons Learned process is to be transferred whenever interacting with civil actors. Communication with all partners is the most important factor to create best practices from lessons learned on the military and the civil side. Results of this process have to be included in training, education, exercises and execution.

Lessons Learned can improve organizational learning, as well on the military as the civil side. The learning process is a dynamic concept. It creates the mindset to appreciate change. This results in the implementation of more capable structures and processes in organizations. This is especially valid for CIMIC in transporting applicable civil procedures into the military. CIMIC personnel must be aware of the importance of LL to improve the system.

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CHAPTER 5 – CIMIC TRAINING AND EDUCATION

0501. General

- a. A solid education & training (E&T) program is a prerequisite for effective and efficient conduct of CIMIC staff work and CIMIC activities including CIMIC projects. Basic E&T for all CIMIC personnel is an essential in advance of all CIMIC activities in the mission theatre, regardless of the type of mission. CIMIC E&T should be tailored to the personnel working level.
- b. A comprehensive approach demands the mutual understanding of all contributors. To create this, all contributors should seek to facilitate and conduct linked training and harmonised education at all stages of preparation and covering all levels. The result is the generation of a coherent approach to the development of CIMIC activities and capabilities.
- c. Further training for specific tasks that CIMIC personnel are expected to fulfil during a mission should then be conducted. It is recommended to integrate the more stand-alone-training and exercises of CIMIC personnel with the other military elements in the pre-operational phase to harmonise and synchronise their efforts. CIMIC should therefore be integrated at both staff and force level training and exercises
- d. In addition to training dedicated CIMIC personnel, NATO commanders should include CIMIC training modules for military force elements that may be employed in direct support of CIMIC activities.
- e. To achieve unity of effort, commanders have to support training with civil actors. This underlines the common purpose, develops better division of responsibilities and creates an understanding of respective capabilities and limitations. Without those having been identified upfront there is no shared basis for E&T. Wherever applicable military and civil actors should identify opportunities for collective training and exercises prior to deployment.

0502. CIMIC Education and Training for military:

- a. When the NAC agrees on an operation, forces are made available by member countries through the force generation process. This may include non-NATO forces. All CIMIC personnel allocated by troop contributing nations should conform to NATO procedures and should follow the training guidance outlined in this chapter. The basis for interoperability is a common CIMIC doctrine and use of compatible hardware for comparable activities. Means of validation could consist of the participation in joint and multinational training and exercises. In addition to the early selection of CIMIC personnel, E&T is a precondition for the sound development of CIMIC expertise for CIMIC staff, activities and projects.

- b. Training of CIMIC Personnel.
- (1) **Basic E&T.** The personnel employed in CIMIC have varying background of military expertise. Therefore basic E&T has to start at the lowest common level of all CIMIC personnel. For this type of training there are, for example, NATO accredited courses, in conjunction with specific training modules. Civil expertise should contribute wherever beneficial, either in the teaching process or as a source of information. Recommended qualifications and proficiencies for this training are:
- (a) Language skills: capable of communicating in English language (English SWRL [speaking/ writing/ reading/ listening] 3333) to attend meetings, give briefings and write reports.
 - (b) Negotiation skills and ability to prepare and conduct meetings.
 - (c) Qualified to work with interpreters.
 - (d) Information technology (IT) and radio communication skills.
 - (e) Displaying a diplomatic, transparent and open minded attitude.
 - (f) Proactive and be able to provide advice & support to all actors (civil and military).
 - (g) Cultural and gender competent.
 - (h) Media awareness (including additional media training).
 - (i) Show reliability and credibility.
 - (j) Show leadership qualities and effective in team-interaction.
 - (k) Display flexibility and logical thought under pressure.
 - (l) Physically and mentally 'Fit for Action' (including basic military skills, if necessary refreshed prior to deployment).
 - (m) Work according to the 'military code of conduct'.
 - (n) Ability to operate in an austere environment.
- (2) **Staff level related E&T.** This training is necessary for CIMIC staff personnel who work at the different staff levels, alongside other joint functions. A prerequisite is a profound knowledge of the OPP and its procedures, with special focus on CIMIC contribution to it. For this type of

training there are, for example, the NATO accredited courses, in conjunction with specific training modules. Civil expertise should contribute to this process where beneficial. Recommended qualifications and proficiencies for this training are:

- (a) Language skills (English SWRL 3333).
- (b) Knowledge of NATO Staff procedures and structures.
- (c) Capable of collecting, selecting and assessing information.
- (d) Understanding political implications of military actions.

Without those qualifications any staff personnel in CIMIC will be likely to underperform on all CIMIC related tasks of staff work.

- (3) **CIMIC job specific training.** Specific posting requirements demand special E&T. Once the requirement has been identified, E&T has to be designed to the requirements and tailored to the function. It is probable that teaching expertise and knowledge will not exist solely within the military structure. Recommended qualifications and proficiencies for this type of training are:

- (a) Ability to make initial critical CIMIC assessments.
- (b) CIMIC field expertise.
- (c) Finance, budget, disbursement, and contracting skills.

- (4) **Mission specific Education & Training.** In order to address 21st Century threats and challenges, one of the key areas of consultation and cooperation for the Alliance's military forces is, among other things, training and exercises, interoperability and civil-military relations. It is linked with the stages in the planning process and the preparation for joint operations.

Prior to training of personnel for specific CIMIC jobs, there should be a selection based on age, military and related CIMIC experience, maturity and appropriate level of rank.

Mission specific training also includes integrated training with appropriate civil actors.

Recommended qualifications and proficiencies fitting in this type of training are:

- (a) Mission knowledge (mandate, commander's intent, plans, orders, tasks, etc.).
 - (b) Situational Awareness.
 - (c) Have a working knowledge of the civil side (organizations, structures, policies, missions, aims, goals, constraints, restrains, 'Code of Conduct', capabilities, concerns, etc.).
- (5) **FS Training.** FS should undertake the basic training syllabus as all qualifications regarding basic training and education are applicable to FS. Without adequate understanding of CIMIC, FS do not possess the applicable profile for CIMIC projects.
- (6) **Civil-Military Liaison Training.** Civil military liaison demands a special set of skills (e.g. negotiation, mediation and interview techniques, communication theory and practice) that are always mission dependent and need to be addressed, trained and enhanced to enable future liaison personnel to successfully perform their tasks during CIMIC work.
- c. **Military forces in direct support of CIMIC.** All military forces in a JOA must either have awareness or knowledge of NATO CIMIC. The type and depth of such training shall be tailored to the mission. Pre-deployment training and education of these units should include a CIMIC module and integrated training. This includes mission rehearsal exercises or mission rehearsal training.

CHAPTER 6 – THE CIVIL ACTORS

0601. General

- a. This chapter offers NATO commanders the explanation of how different civil actors, consisting of national civil administration, host nation civil administration, various political bodies, international organizations (IOs), governmental organizations (GOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), global economic bodies and the population itself are influencing the conduct of military operations, as well as explaining rudimentary their fundamental principles and believes. This insight will improve awareness and understanding, promoting a comprehensive approach.
- b. Experience has shown that the context of missions can vary markedly. A common feature, however, is the complex assortment of actors engaged in the JOA and beyond. In addition to the indigenous population, and the parties to the conflict, multinational military forces have to operate in complete consideration of the presence of other actors in the area as media, diplomats, IOs, NGOs, and GOs. This complex list of actors must increasingly operate in a coordinated and complementary style, ideally harmonised by a Special Representative (SR) of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, European Union or other multinational entities.
- c. The SR will seek to coordinate all efforts of civil actors. Those entities organise themselves in a Cluster Approach (see paragraph 0508), appointing a Cluster Leader for the various working fields. The Cluster Leader transfers information from the SR to the members of its cluster and vice versa. Additionally this function embeds harmonisation and de-confliction of work within the cluster itself.
- d. Wherever a Comprehensive Approach demands the participation of military expertise in these clusters, CIMIC should contribute in its' civil military liaison function.
- e. Civil actors follow a set of principles governing their work and its conduct. Although they might not share their organizational design, they are all founded on an idea or theory (e.g. religious NGOs, Humanitarian Aid Agencies) and an area of expertise, ranging from humanitarian aid to reconstruction and development, economic support, educational issues and many other aspects. This variety of approaches results in different agendas, structures and procedures. Understanding the motivation of the civil actors enables military personnel to minimise friction when interacting with civil actors.
- f. The commitments that civil actors devote themselves to are not only found in the area of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. It spreads over a vast spectrum from immediate assistance to save lives to long-term economical development projects, infrastructural stabilisation, educational aspects or society-developing

issues in general. All those have an impact on the overall situation, therefore should be part of the militaries' plan of interaction.

0602. The humanitarian principles

- a. **Core Principles.** UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 provides guiding principles for UN humanitarian assistance (HA) operations: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. NATO forces operating under UN authority should apply them.
 - (1) **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.
 - (2) **Neutrality.** HA must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
 - (3) **Impartiality.** HA must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

- b. **Guiding Principles for Humanitarian and Development Assistance.** In addition to the three core principles, civil actors also developed a catalogue of ten principles that will provide more detailed guidance to the planning and conduct of projects. They are:
 - (1) **Objective of Humanitarian and Development Assistance.** We are working together to contribute to improvements in the quality of life of the people. Our assistance focuses on alleviating suffering, eradicating poverty, enabling communities to become self-sufficient and supporting an inclusive peaceful solution to the conflict.
 - (2) **Non-discrimination.** We provide assistance solely based on identified needs, regardless of location, ethnicity, gender, social status or religion.
 - (3) **Impartiality.** We will remain impartial and we do not accept our assistance, supplies, vehicles, facilities or equipment to be used for any military, political or sectarian purposes.
 - (4) **Respect of human dignity.** We request the respect for human rights as may depicted in customary international law. We work in response to the expressed wishes of local communities, and we respect the dignity of people, their culture, religion and customs.

- (5) **Transparency and accountability.** We are accountable to those whom we seek to assist. We ensure that our assistance is transparent. We will not tolerate any corruption, theft or misuse of development or humanitarian supplies or equipment.
- (6) **Sustainability and preparedness.** We tailor our activities to local circumstances and aim to enhance locally available resources. We strengthen local capacities (civil society, business community, local authorities, etc) to address current needs and to prevent or prepare for future emergencies.
- (7) **Consultation and participation.** We seek to involve communities in the design, planning, management, implementation and evaluation of programmes implemented for their benefit.
- (8) **Coordination.** We coordinate our activities with government and all relevant stakeholders at every level.
- (9) **Access.** We request as a basic requirement, unrestricted access to all people in need of assistance. We expect relevant authorities to expedite the accreditation of staff and the customs clearance of humanitarian goods and services.
- (10) **Security and safety.** We request all parties concerned to protect and promote the safety, security and freedom of the agencies and their staff. We do not accept staff to be subjected to violence, abduction, harassment or intimidation. Our vehicles should not be used to transport persons or goods that have no connections with our work.

0603. International organizations

- a. An international organization is an organization with an international membership, scope, or presence. There are two main types:
 - (1) International non-governmental organizations (INGOs): non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that operate internationally. These may be either:
 - (a) International non-profit organizations. Examples include the World Organization of the Scout Movement, International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières.
 - (b) International corporations, referred to as multinational corporations.
 - (2) Intergovernmental organizations, also known as international governmental organizations (IGOs): the type of organization most closely associated with the term 'international organization', these are organizations that are made up

primarily of sovereign states (referred to as member states). Notable examples include the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (CoE), European Union (EU; which is a prime example of a supranational organization), and World Trade Organization (WTO).

- b. **Principles and values.** The disparate nature of IOs makes it difficult to generalise about their characteristics. Clearly, a security focussed body like NATO is fundamentally different to an IO that serves a humanitarian or diplomatic agenda. Security actors tend to have evolved characteristics that mirror military hierarchical structures, whilst the humanitarian sector reflects the decentralised and flattened approaches needed to derive maximum field based impact. The humanitarian bodies' decision-making, financing, and resourcing procedures are highly devolved with individuals operating with considerable autonomy in the JOA. Rather than being appointment based, 'authority' is derived from competence and egalitarian negotiations where the impact of personal dynamics can be very important. Internal management is achieved through policy statements that can be readily challenged.
- c. **Organization.** Coordination between humanitarian organizations is rarely 'ordered'. Instead, it tends to reflect a temporary accommodation born of pragmatism and necessity. However, as the sophistication of the solutions fielded by security and humanitarian actors has increased there is some convergence in the nature of those operating in the field. Both sectors value characteristics such as: loyalty, integrity, initiative, humanity, leadership, perseverance and intellect. Cross flow of personnel from the military into IOs has increased so that many major IO country teams now contain ex-military staff. Nevertheless, a distance between the military and IO actors remains. In many situations, it is this distance between military and civil actors that affords room for separation, therefore making those differences distinguishable, to achieve the high level aims of a comprehensive approach.
- d. **Decision Making Process and Hierarchies.** IOs can suffer the same discontinuity in perspective between the field and headquarters as the military. This can become pronounced when communication becomes difficult, or the tempo of events exceeds the decision-making capacity of IOs.

0604. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Separate mention should be made of the ICRC which, unlike those IOs mentioned above, was not established by intergovernmental agreement. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. Its authority was formed through a permanent mandate founded in international law; a worldwide mission to help victims of conflicts. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in

situations of conflict and their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique status as it fulfils a role conferred upon it by international treaties of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which virtually all countries in the world are party (and their Additional Protocols of 1977) and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

0605. Non-governmental organizations

A NGO is a private, non-profit voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities whose primary purpose is either to design and implement development-related projects or defend or promote a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level. The UN formally recognises certain private associations as a result of their consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. The UN collectively refers to these associations as NGOs. In common usage, however, the term is applied to any private body engaged in humanitarian/charitable activities, whether or not they maintain UN consultative status. In recent decades there has been an enormous increase in the number and scale of NGOs. At one extreme the body may resemble a multinational corporation, with significant budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage. At the other end of the scale local NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low budget and limited means.

- a. **Principles and Values.** NGOs are often highly motivated, displaying a vocational drive and belief in the causes championed by their donors. Increasingly, they are willing to concede that coordination is necessary in pursuit of high-level aims. Caution over partiality and association with a comprehensive approach remains a very real and understandable issue. Military personnel must understand the necessity for NGOs to defer to the values their donors expect them to be championing. This ‘donor sentiment’ demands that NGOs seek effective solutions in the most pressing of circumstances. First and foremost NGOs are accountable to their beneficiaries ensuring that the effects of their actions benefit those that they are trying to help. Secondly, NGOs are accountable to their benefactors, be they individuals or national donors, ensuring that funds donated are spent effectively and appropriately. Finally NGOs are accountable to their trustees, thereby ensuring that their actions remain true to their organization’s values.
- b. **Interaction and Understanding.** Experience has shown that an acceptable degree of complementary activity can be achieved whilst adhering to the humanitarian principles that must guide NGO activity. Most NGOs have now become signatories to the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’. This voluntary code lays down principles of conduct for NGOs and describes how host governments, donor governments and IOs should shape the working environment to deliver HA. It is important that military personnel understand these humanitarian principles and the rationale for their adoption.

- c. **Organization.** Most NGOs will operate within a territory using a recognisable and flat command and control structure based upon a country director, supported by a small number of deputies and, beneath that level, field personnel bring policies and programmes into effect.

0606. Governmental organizations (GO)

GOs are, depending on their specific area of expertise dependent to nations supporting efforts in the JOA. They have either an expertise in good governance, health support, economic development, infrastructural reconstruction and development, education and political capacity building. Their main focus varies from granting HA to long term development projects.

0607. Civil Police

Properly resourced and effectively coordinated civil police forces can play a role in reaching the desired end state. While police liaison is normally conducted through the office of the Provost Marshal, CIMIC staff should ensure that a close relationship is established and maintained. Neither the military and civilian police nor the humanitarian and development communities are homogenous. Military and civilian police contingents vary in capability, doctrine, procedures, and understanding of humanitarian and development issues. The humanitarian and development communities vary widely in mandate, outlook, degree of integration into the humanitarian coordination system, and in approach to dealing with the military and civilian police.

0608. Working with civil actors:

- a. **Cluster Approach.** In December 2005 the Inter Agency Standing Committee Principals designated global cluster leads (see 0508c) for eleven sectors or areas of activity that in the past either lacked predictable leadership in situations of humanitarian emergency, or where there was considered to be a need to strengthen leadership and partnership with other humanitarian actors. This complements those sectors and categories of population where leadership and accountability are already clear, e.g. agriculture (led by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), food (led by World Food Programme), refugees (led by United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees) and education (led by United Nations Children's Fund). In the case of education in emergencies, however, there may be some further modification to the existing arrangements.
- b. **The Cluster Leader.** The cluster leaders, together with their partners, provide the following types of support to strengthen field response:

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- (1) Technical surge capacity (e.g. camp management and coordination staff, early recovery advisors, Logistics Response Teams, Health Emergency and Assessment Response Teams).
- (2) Trained experts to lead cluster coordination at the field level.
- (3) Increased stockpiles, some pre-positioned within regions (e.g. emergency shelter materials);
- (4) Standardised technical tools, including for information management;
- (5) Agreement on common methods and formats for needs assessments, monitoring, and benchmarking; and
- (6) Best practices and lessons learned from field tests.

c. The clusters

Sector or Area of Activity	Global Cluster Lead
Agriculture	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
Camp Coordination / Management:	
- Conflict-induced IDPs	United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees (UN OCHA)
- Natural disaster induced IDPs	International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Early Recovery	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Education	United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Save The Children - United Kingdom
Emergency Shelter:	
- Disaster situations	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- Conflict-induced IDPs	United Nations High Commissioners Office for Refugees (UNHCR)
Emergency Telecommunications:	
- Process	UN OCHA
- Data	UNICEF
- Security	World Food Programme (WFP)
Health	World Health Organization (WHO)
Logistics	WFP

Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	UNHCR
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	UNICEF
Cross-cutting issues	
Age	HelpAge International
Environment	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Gender	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), WHO
HIV / AIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV / AIDS (UNAIDS)

- d. **Standards and Evaluations.** The most well known set of standards is the SPHERE standards. These standards provide a widely accepted set of universal minimum standards in core areas of HA and aim to improve both the quality and the accountability of assistance. The cornerstone of the standards is the ‘Humanitarian Charter’, which describes the core principles that govern humanitarian action. The standards themselves are broken down into 5 sectors: water and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning and health services. NATO personnel involved in humanitarian activities should be familiar with the SPHERE standards and apply them as appropriate, taking into account the local situation.¹²

0609. Key challenges:

- a. The increasing proximity between the military and humanitarian actors implies a need for the two communities to find agreement on core issues of responsibility and competence. In doing this, investment is needed to gather evidence to show whether the military’s delivery of assistance (a marginal activity compared to their core operations) is inimical to good outcomes for local populations – even in the short term. Equally, greater consideration of the actual contribution ‘hearts and minds’ operations make to force protection would be valuable, recognising that any assistance mission should be conducted in accordance with needs-based criteria. At the very least, if military efforts are directed towards implementing relief or rehabilitation efforts, these should concentrate on areas of comparative expertise. This implies understanding exactly where these areas are. This could involve agreement that militaries focus on providing assistance that humanitarian agencies cannot (in security and large-scale infrastructural work, for instance), and that both communities work together more effectively to define respective roles and objectives in the protection of civilians.

¹² For further information refer to “The SPHERE project humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response”

The increased engagement of the military in policy and “operational areas of humanitarian concern” raise a number of key issues. Three in particular stand out:

- (1) What does the promotion of combined military, political and humanitarian efforts mean for the integrity of humanitarian principles?
 - (2) What should the military role be in the protection of civilians from deliberate harm?
 - (3) What impact will the growing use of private military firms in providing security for assistance efforts have on humanitarian action?
- b. Especially the field of language and terminology requires attention of both military and civilian personnel. The different use of those in the military and the area of civil actors can cause misunderstanding and creates loss of efficiency. Awareness and communications training will provide CIMIC personnel with the needed tools to avoid many difficulties in this area and enables them to function as multiplier within the force.

LEXICON

PART I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Part I of the Lexicon contains abbreviations/acronyms used in AJP-9.

AJP	Allied Joint Publication
E&T	Education & Training
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COA	Course of Action
CU	Civil Military Cooperation Unit
GO	Governmental Organization
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HQ	Headquarters
HNS	Host Nation Support
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
JOA	Joint Operations Area
LL	Lessons Learned
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OPLAN	Operation Plan
SR	Special Representative
UN	United Nations

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Part II of the lexicon contains terms and their definitions used within AJP-9. Unless otherwise stated, they are drawn from AAP-6(2009) '*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'. Those marked (1) are to be submitted to the NATO Terminology Programme for consideration on behalf of the AJODWG.

civil-military cooperation

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.

command

1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, an organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area of situation.
5. To exercise a command.

control

1. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.
2. In mapping, charting and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined.

doctrine

Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

end-state

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The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.

host-nation support (HNS)

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/ or other forces and organizations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory.

international organizations (IO)

An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organization formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.

joint

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. Also called 'multiservice'.

joint operations area

A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency - or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations.

mission

A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

multinational

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.

non-governmental organization (NGO)

Voluntary organizations that are not usually funded by governments. The term is used in Article 71 of the UN Charter. They are primarily non-profit organizations that are independent of government, international organizations or commercial interests. They are legally different from UN agencies and other IOs in that they write their own charter and mission.

objective (Obj)

A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralising an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.

operation (Op)

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

operational command (OPCOM)

1. The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of combatant, unified, and specified commands over assigned forces.
2. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics. OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. (See also operational control (OPCON).)

operation order (OPORD)

A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. See also operation order.

operation plan (OPLAN)

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

support

The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. 'In support of' designates the support provided to another unit, formation or organization while remaining under the initial command.

sustainability

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

tactical command (TACOM)

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Is defined as the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command to accomplish the mission assigned by higher authority. TACOM is narrower in application than OPCOM but includes the authority to delegate or retain TACON.

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Strasbourg – Kehl 2009

Military Committee (MC) 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy

MC 133/3, NATO's Operational Planning Systems

MC 327/2, NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 CRO

MC 411/1, NATO Military Policy on CIMIC

MC 334/2, NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS)

MC 324/1, NATO Military Command Structure

MC 0458/2, NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation Policy

MC 343/1, NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations

MC 0550 MC Guidance for the Military implementation of the CPG

AC/35-D/1040, Information and Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO Entities

AJP-01(D) (under ratification)

AJP-3(B) (under ratification)

AJP-4(A)

AJP-4.5(A) Host Nation Support

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